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STUDENT NOTES
Guaranteed Shareholder Loans and Thin Capitalization
Ideally, a revenue system should apportion the tax burden ac-
cording to economic realities. Legal fictions may, however, inter-
fere with the concept of economic reality. One example is corpor-
ate law. While there are innumerable decisions establishing the
corporation as a separate entity, economically it is nothing more
than a conglomerate group of individuals. And when this legal
fiction is employed in the closely held corporation, irreconcilable
results are to be expected.
Where widely held corporations are involved, the vast majority
of cases recognize any debt instrument as genuine; but, at the
other extreme where a corporation is closely held, and the debt
is held in proportion to the equity interests, uncertainty prevails
as to whether the debt is actually debt or equity. Corporations,
however, are separate legal entities: be they owned by one indi-
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vidual or by several thousand; and if a widely held corporation may
finance a part of its operation by debt, then to keep the corporate
fiction intact, a closely held corporation should be able to finance
a part of its operation by debt. Thus, the problem is one of deter-
mining, for the closely held corporation, how much of the capital
structure can safety be denominated as debt.
There are non-tax reasons for using debt in the corporate financial
structure. Leverage may enable one to increase his return on the
invested capital; and in the event of a corporate failure, where the
shareholder is also a creditor, he will share proportionally with
all other creditors as to his corporate debt; whereas he will receive
nothing in return for his equity contribution until after all the
creditors have first been paid.
One tax advantage arising out of the corporate fiction is that the
shareholder can sell appreciated assets to his corporation. He pays
a capital gains tax on the profits of the sale, but his corporation
gets a stepped-up basis for depreciation.' By this method the tax-
payer can realize what would have been ordinary income at a
capital gains rate. Also, the sale could be reported under the
installment sales provisions since the sale price is usually paid over
an extended period of time.
The cost of attempting to sell appreciated assets to the corpora-
tion and failing may be high. If the Commissioner is successful in
bringing the transfer within section 351 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, through the theory of thin capitalization, the assets
would retain their original basis and the corporation would owe tax
dollars for the over-depreciation. The transfer would be a con-
tribution to capital; the repayment of principal would be con-
sidered constructive dividends and as such would be income to the
shareholder; the interest payments deducted by the corporation
would be disallowed; and since the determination may not take
place for a number of years, the tax deficiency could be enormous.
Even worse, if the statute of limitations has expired as to the year
of the transfer, the shareholder may not be able to recover the
taxes paid on the alleged capital gain.'
But in INT. 11Ev. CoDn of 1954, § 1239, a gain on a sale of depreciable
roperty between a shareholder who owns more than 80% of the stock and
is corporation is ordinary income. Thus, the sale is only effective if the
shareholder owns less than 80%.2 See generally, New Thin Incorporation Threat: Repayment of Guaranteed
Bank Loans Treated as Dividends, 23 J. TAXATON 197, 198 (1965).
1967]
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Over a decade ago it was said that shareholder guaranteed loans
would wholly eliminate the problem of thin capitalization.3 It
was felt that the shareholder should, instead of lending his own
money to the corporation, borrow from a third party and guaran-
tee the loan. The guaranteed loan would lessen the tax advantage
somewhat, but if it would eliminate the threat of thin capitalization,
it would be well worth the additional cost.' Recently this feeling
of security has waned.
Originally, shareholder guaranteed loans were somewhat success-
ful. They were used as a means of converting losses on loans
to corporations from nonbusiness bad debts (short them capital loss)
into ordinary loss in a transaction entered into for profit.' In the
cases of Pollak v. Commissioner,6 Edwards v. Allen7 and Cudlip v.
Commissioner8 the shareholder was attempting to get a business
bad debt deduction for a guaranty that became bad. The share-
holders in these cases were not confronted with the question of
whether the loss was fully deductible as incurred in a transaction
entered into for profit.
The Commissioner lost all three of these cases. In reading them
it must be questioned why the Commissioner did not pose the
question of thin capitalization. In the Pollak case the shareholder
had an original capital contribution of $20,000. The bank notes
less than two years later totaled $200,000 and were endorsed by
the shareholder and another. The shareholder guaranteed the
notes a few months before the corporation went bankrupt. He
was allowed an ordinary loss deduction. The Commissioner's entire
attack was based on the fact that the guaranty constituted a loss
sustained from a statutory non-business bad debt. It would seem
3 Lutz, Capital Formation of Speculative Enterprises 34 TAxEs 420, 423
(1956); Fuller, Tax Results of Shareholder Advances and Guaranty Payments,
29 TuL. L. REv. 775, 783 (1955).
4 It should be noted that there are ordinarily two instances in which the
shareholder guaranteed loan is utilized: (1) a corporation launched with in-
adequate capital borrows from a third party, such loans being guaranteed by
the shareholder; (2) a newly organized corporation issues a nominal amount
of stock and an excessive amount of notes which are guaranteed by the
shareholder. In this second type of situation the section 351 problem is
present in addition to the question of interest deductions and repayment of
principal. For analytical purposes the issue will be considered as the same
for both instances-Will the shareholder guaranteed loan eliminate a thin
capitalization attack?
5 INT. REV. CoDE of 1939, § 23 (e) now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165
(c) (2).6 Follak v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1954).
7 Edwards v. Allen, 216 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954).
8 Cudlip v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1955).
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that the Commissioner could have also attacked the transaction on
the basis of thin capitalization by attempting to show that the
real substance of the arrangement was a shareholder contribution
to the corporation and any loss would be a capital loss. The 10:1
ratio of debt to equity would have been an indication that this
was in substance a shareholder contribution.
In the Edwards case the court again upheld the loss on guaran-
teed shareholder loan as ordinary; and, the Commissioner in a
questionable debt-equity structure never mentioned thin incorpora-
tion.
In Cudlip, the taxpayer and 2 others, who together held more
than 75% of the stock, guaranteed a $90,000 loan to the corporation
which had a capital contribution of only $5,000. In the Tax Court
the Commissioner again centered his entire argument on the
question of a bad debt loss. No mention was made concerning the
thinness of a corporation with an 18:1 debt to equity ratio. On
appeal the Commissioner's argument of nonbusiness bad debt
was rejected. This dissenting judge, however, interpreted the
situation differently. His analysis was as follows: At the time the
taxpayer's corporation was organized it had commitments requiring
expenditures of $85,000 during its first three years of existence.
Yet its capital contribution consisted of only $5,000. Obviously more
risk capital was required. If the taxpayer had made the neces-
sary additional investment in any of the conventional forms-stock
or a loan-his loss would have been a capital loss. But because
he happened to, instead, risk his money by guaranteeing the
corporation's bank loans, the court allowed him an ordinary loss. Yet
from the taxpayer's viewpoint the situation was exactly the same
as if he had borrowed the money himself and then lent it to the
corporation."'
The Supreme Court of the United States in Putnam v. Commis-
sioner" overruled the ordinary loss argument for the shareholder
guaranteed loans by stating that Congress intended for this type
of loss to be a nonbusiness bad debt (capital loss). The court
utilized the dissent's reasoning in Cudlip and concluded: "There is
no real or economic difference between the loss of an investment
9Id.
,0 Id. at 572.
,1 Putman v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
19671
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made in the form of a direct loan to a corporation and one made in-
directly in the form of a guaranteed bank loan." 2
One author believes this statement could be extended to the fol-
lowing: There is no real or economic difference between a direct
loan, which is treated as a contribution to capital because the
corporation is too thin, and a loan made indirectly by guaranteeing
the corporation's notes.'3 This type of policy would put guaranteed
shareholder loans under the same type of attack as direct share-
holder loans - thin capitalization.
Putnam was decided in 1956. Until 1965 there were no cases
which challenged the shareholder guaranteed loan on the basis of
thin capitalization. In 1965 the case of Murphy Logging Co. v.
United States'4 was first adjudicated. In this case three partners
organized a corporation capitalized at $1,500 and transferred part-
nership equipment valued at $238,150 to the corporation. The
equipment was paid for out of a $240,000 loan by a bank to the
corporation. The loan was guaranteed by the partners. In the
partnership return for 1959 the partners reported a long term capital
gain on the sale of the equipment in the amount of $209,735. The
Commissioner treated the transfer as a non-taxable exchange under
the provisions of section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
reduced the claimed depreciation charges, and disallowed the
interest deductions.
Two important factors were mentioned by the District Court.
First the court stated that both thin capitalization and lack of an
arm's length transaction raise questions as to whether the substance
is the same as the form, even though neither in itself is needed to
make the transaction valid. Secondly, it was noted that the new
corporation did not comply with the traditional debt formalities.
The court concluded that the real substance of the transaction was
a capital contribution of equipment by the brothers to the corpora-
tion and a loan by the bank to the individuals. The District Court
was overruled on appeal. But, the decision of the District Court is
important in that it indicates that the guaranteed loan situation is
subject to the thin capitalization doctrine; and the analysis of the
12 Id. at 92-93
'3 B. BrrnERr & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION OF ConPonATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.08 (2d ed. 1966).
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District Court further indicates that the guaranteed loan situation
will be examined through the use of the traditional factors used in
deciding thin capitalization cases.
The traditional factors which courts have cited as indicia of a
thinly capitalized corporation are: form, debt to equity ratio, pro
rata holding, core asset and risk of the business, business purpose,
and the arm's length transaction.
These factors will be presented as interpreted by the courts,
followed by a discussion of their applicability to the guaranteed
loan situation.
I. Fom
The form of the debt is mentioned in almost every thin capitaliza-
tion case, yet it is often overlooked by the taxpayer. If the corpora-
tion and shareholder-creditor act as if the alleged debt instru-
ment is other than what it purports to be, it casts doubt upon the
true character of the transaction. '5
Some aspects of form are the designation in minutes, records,
instruments, and other corporation records that there is a debt
with a fixed maturity date and a reasonable interest cost. Also,
there should be no rights to participate in the management, the debt
should not be subordinated and it should be legally transferrable.' 6
After the formalities are established it is essential to comply
with them. If interest payments are not made on time'" or principal
repayments are not made at maturity'8 the courts in using hindsight
may infer that no debt was in fact intended. Typical is the case
that begins with the statement, "In form the instruments are clearly
debt."'9 The form and the following through will not always win
the battle, but at least the contest is not decided before it begins.
II. DEBT TO EQUITY RATiO
At one time a high debt to equity ratio raised a strong, almost
insurmountable inference that the amount paid in was a contribu-
15 John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).
16 Id.
' Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957) remanding
15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 688 (1956), on remand 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29
1958), aff'd 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002
S1959).
18 Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408, 419 (1954), aft'd, 236 F.2d 159,
163 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
'9 Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667, 686 (1965).
19671
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tion to capital." Even then, however, most courts felt that thin-
ness alone was not a sufficient basis for treating alleged debt as
equity.'
It appears as if now, while a high debt to equity ratio raises the
suspicion of the court,22 it is only one more factor to consider. In
many instances the taxpayer has been able to maintain the debt
in the face of an extremely high debt to equity ratio.22 One method
by which this factor has been offset has been by the showing of
goodwill.2"
The exact point of safety is difficult to determine. Courts have
found alleged debt to be equity even with very low ratios.2 It
would appear though, that a high ratio is still harmful while a low
ratio does not do the taxpayer much good until it gets below 4:1,6
and there is a substantial amount of equity capital.2"
III. PRo RATA HOLDING
When it appears that the shareholders hold the debt approxi-
mately in proportion to their equity holdings, there is again a strong
inference that the so called loans are risk capital.2 On the other
hand a sharply disproportionate ratio between ownership of stock
and debt will go far to overcome such factors as a high debt to
equity ratio2 9 as there is much less reason to question the bona
fides of the debtor-creditors relationship; but the absence of pro
20 Isidor Dobldn, 15 T.C. 31, 33 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392
(2d Cir. 1951); Sam Schnitzer 13 T.C. 43, 62 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 183
F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951).
21 Colony, Inc., 26 T.C. 30, 42 (1956), aff'd per curiam on other grounds,
244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
22 Leach Corp., 30 T.C. 563, 578 (1959).
23 Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965) (Ratio 30:1); see also J. I.
Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. 881 (1958), revd 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959) (ratio
50:1); Sun Properties v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955) (ratio
41,000:1); Ainslie Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955) (ratio 1013:1).24 Ainslee Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955); J. I. Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. 881
(1958), rev'd 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959).
25 Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd 236 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 1031 (1957).
26 See generally Goldstein, Corporate Indeptedness to Shareholders: 'Thin
Capitalization' and Related Problems, 16 TAx L. REv. 1, 20 (1960) where
the author states that because the ratio of debt to equity after the recapitali-
zation in Talbot Mills, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), was 4:1, many courts and
commentators seemed to feel that in the judgment of the Supreme Court, 4:1
was not clearly inadequate.
27 Charles Vantress, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 711, 716 (1964).
28 Gloucester Ice and Cold Storage Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1015,
1020 (1960).
29 Leach Corp., 30 T.C. 563, 579 (1958).
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rata holding of debt and equity, in itself, does not insure tax-
payer success."
The logic behind the pro rata holding argument is that the less
shares the debtor holds the more he tends to think like a creditor;
he will be less willing to subordinate his debt, and more willing
to foreclose upon a default than, for example, a sole shareholder who
is also a creditor.
Family holdings of different amounts do not make the situation
any less proportionate. The court may merely consider the family
as a unit."
The first three factors - form, debt to equity ratio and pro rata
holding are relatively easy to prove, and as such are obvious grounds
upon which the Commissioner can attack a thin capitalization situa-
tion. Usually though, it takes more than a factual showing of the
corporate structure to convince the court that there was a sham
transaction as indicated by a typical statement made in Estate of
Miller v. Commissioner:32
We know of no rule which permits the Commissioner to
dictate what portion of a corporation's operations should be
provided for by equity financing rather than by debt.
Such a statement would seem to intimate that the corporation with
a high debt to equity ratio held proportionately will not be invalid
per se. There is a further test of economic reality. Courts, to test
the economic reality, have applied such theories as core asset and
risk of the business, business purpose, and arm's length transaction.
IV. ComR AssEr AND RISK OF THE BusmNss
A theory advanced in many cases is that of the core asset or risk
of the business. This theory provides that if certain dollars are
used to purchase assets which constitute the basis of the company,
these dollars should be considered equity.
30 Colony, Inc., 26 T.C. 30, 43 (1956), aff'd per curiam on other grounds,
244 F.2d 75 (6th Cfr. 1957), -rev.d on other grounds, 357 U.S. 28 (1958). The
court said that a disproportionate holding of amounts among shareholders
was of no greater weight than disproportionate amounts among common and
preferred shareholders.
3, Wilbur Security Co., 31 T.C. 938, 951 (1959).
32 239 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1956).
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In Schnitzer33 advances to a corporation were, as found by the
court, invested in the corporation's permanent assets (organization
and plant). As such the advances had been placed "at the risk of
the business," and were considered risk capital, and, therefore,
they could not be considered debt. In another case, advances for
working capital were deemed to be at the risk of the business and
therefore equity." Furthermore whenever an advancement could
be intended as venture capital, it was placed at the risk of the
business especially if it was in proportion to stockholdings.3"
This concept has not escaped criticism. For whatever a corpora-
tion's assets - plant, equipment, inventory, cash and the like -
they are at the risk of the business in that unpaid creditors may
seize them. 6 Then, too, it is difficult to single out the specific
money used to purchase the so-called "risk" assets from that used to
purchase the "non-risk" assets.
V. BusiNrss PuRPOSE
In Gregory v. Helvering7 the court in analyzing a reorganization
stated that if the motive of taxation was discarded, there would
simply be an transaction with no business or corporate purpose. The
"business purpose" test was then later used in determining if
advances should be treated as loans." The presence of a valid
business purpose would strengthen the taxpayer's position; the
lack of it would indicate a sham or meaningless transaction.
The business purpose test has lost some of its former in-
fluence as some courts have made statements to the effect that
the taxpayer is entitled to arrange his affairs to minimize his taxes
and this in itself would be a valid business purpose. 9
33 Sam Schnitzer, 13 T.C. 43, 61 (1949).34 Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.G. 31 (1950), af'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392
2d Cir. 1951).
35 Gloucester Ice and Cold Storage Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1015, 1020
(1960); Benjamin Gilbert 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 688 (1956), reo'd, 248 F.2d
399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957), on remand, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29 (1958), affd,
262 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
36 Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 10 U. FLA. L.
REv. 25, 40 (1957).
37 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1934).
38 Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159,
163 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
39 Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 118, 128 (2d.
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The business purpose test was specifically rejected in Nassau
Lens Co.,4" but it continues to be mentioned in almost all thin
capitalization decisions and if a business purpose is present, it
may still help to overcome other harmful factors."
VI. Aiu's LENGTH TRANSACTION
Another test commonly mentioned is the presence of, or lack
of, an arm's length transaction. In Nassau Lens the court said that
traditional factors were important only as evidence whether the
taxpayer could and would be repaid in accordance with substan-
tial economic reality and arm's length transactions.42
Perhaps a test such as this would lend more certainty to the
debt versus equity area. 3 The taxpayer would have to show that
there was a reasonable expectancy that the loan would be repaid
in accordance with terms consistent with those prevailing in the
general community. The fundamental question would be the same
as corporate management asks itself in considering debt - how
much money could be borrowed with the assurance that the
corporation could continue to service its debts and still repay the
loan without risking insolvency. This approach has the theoretical
advantage of equating the debt structure of closely held corpora-
tions with corporations which are widely held; the difference being
that in widely held corporations management makes the total debt
decision whereas in closely held corporations the ultimate decision
would rest with the courts.
As should be obvious by now, the aspect of thinness cannot
be tied down to anything concise. The decisions go in all direc-
tions.44 Nor can the situation be alleviated by consulting before-
hand with the Internal Revenue Service. The service will not issue
rulings on what will constitute stock or securities where part of the
consideration received by the transferors consists of bonds, deben-
tures, or notes, which, when compared to the capital stock of the
40 308 F.2d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1962) remanding 35 T.C. 268 (1960).
41 J. 1. Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. 881, 890 (1958) rev'd 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir.
1959). The 50:1 ratio of debt to equity was partially overcome in the tax
court by the business purpose of the transaction which was to retain former
employees.4 302 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962) remanding 35 T.C. 268 (1960).
43 See generally Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization, 40 TAXEs 974
(1962).
44 This conclusion was also reached in Rockier, Transfers to Controlled
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corporation, gives rise to the question of a "thin corporation".45
Neither will the service ordinarily issue rulings on transfers to con-
trolled corporations where part of the consideration received by the
transferors consists of bond, debentures or any other evidences
of indebtedness of the transferee4 6 ; nor whether advances to "thin
corporations" constitute loans or are equity investments."7 The
question still remains as to whether shareholder guaranteed loans
will eliminate the thin capitalization attack. The answer must, in
light of the District Court decision of the Murphy Logging Co.
case,48 the Fors Farms, Inc.49 case and comments by persons in the
tax area,"0 be in the negative. However, the Commissioner has
yet to win a case in this area, and the guaranteed loan in light of the
traditional factors cited by the courts, offers a greater insulation
against a thin capitalization attack than the direct shareholder loan.
The guaranteed loan will usually have all the formal characteris-
tics of debt5" since there is a third party who is looking out for his
own interests. He will not tolerate late interest or extended princi-
pal payments, and being in the lending business, the traditional debt
formalities will normally be carried out.
For the government to prove its case in a guaranteed loan situa-
tion, it must show that the shareholders were the constructive
borrowers and the constructive contributors of the loan proceeds to
the corporation and that each corporation payment of interest
and principal is therefore constructively for the account of the share-
holder.2 If the debt is not an actual sham the pro rata holding
will not be present without employing the previous constructive
fictions.
Trying to prove that the money lent by a bank went to the "risk of
the business" and therefore equity would involve some contradic-
tions since the theory presumes that no lender would place his
4 Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 949.
46 Id. at 951.47 Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 949 as amended by Rev. Proc.
67-29, 1967 I.R.B. 28-29.
48239 F. Supp. 794 (D. Oregon 1965), rev'd, 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.1967).49Fors Farms, Inc. v. United States, 66-1 U.S.T.C. Para. 9206 (1966).
50 Hickman The Thin Corporation: Another Look at an Old Disease, 44
TAXEs 883, 889 (1966).51 In the Murphy Logging case, the lower court mentioned specifically that
some of the formal characteristics of a loan were missing.
52 Aarons, Debt v. Equity: Special Hazards in Setting Up the Corporate
Capital Structure, 23 J. TAXATION 194, 195 (1965).
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money at the risk of the business which is what actually happened.
The theory the government will probably use, as was used in the
Murphy Logging case, will be that there is a lack of an arm's
length transaction. The Murphy Logging case actually decided
nothing in this area since on appeal the court found that the good-
will was enough to prevent the corporation from being thinly
capitalized,53 and thus removed the necessity of finding an arm's
length transaction.
The question of an arm's length transaction, especially in the
face of the shareholder's personal guarantee, must depend on the
intention of the bank (or any other lender). If the bank is looking
to the corporation for payment, then there is an arm's length trans-
action; this would not be so if the bank is really looking to the
individual shareholders through their personal guarantee.5 4
The proof of the bank's intention is made difficult for the reason
that the bank will want to insure its debt as best it can, and the
better insurance the bank gets, the worse the chances of the trans-
action surviving the Commissioner's attack. If the bank succeeds in
requiring the shareholder to pledge his personal assets as part of the
guarantee, then surely it appears on the surface as if the bank is
not depending on the corporation for the repayment.
From the point of view of the taxpayer he is better off if he can
persuade the bank to forget the guarantee altogether, and if this is
not possible at least avoid pledging any private assets. It would be
even better to pledge the corporate assets, for then the taxpayer
could point to the security as proof that the bank was looking to
the corporation for repayment.55
L. E. Friend II
53 In the Murphy Logging case the appeal court found goodwill whereas
the lower court found exactly the opposite-no goodwill.
5In the Murphy Logging case the lower court did not believe the banker's
testimony that he was looking to the corporation for repayment.
-5 Hickmnan, The Thin Corporation: Another Look at an Old Disease, 44
TAxEs 883. 891 (1966).
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